Questions from Mumbai

The 60-hour battle across the commercial and tourist centre of Mumbai raises many questions about the changing nature of terrorism and the response of the authorities, not only in India, but across the world.

Have terrorists changed their tactics?
The trained ruthlessness of the Mumbai commando-terrorists marks a step-change in the tactics and methods of Islamic Jihadi extremists. Highly trained and motivated groups, equivalent to an SAS four-man combat troop, armed with light and flexible weapons - and seemingly without cumbersome equipment, such as suicide vests, that can go wrong - they were able to bring chaos and destruction to a city of 18m people. They had been trained to shoot and kill and move on quickly from target to target. They also appear to have been trained to 'fight through' their objectives.

Where did their ideas come from?
The planners made up their new concept of operations from an amalgam of old tactics and playbooks: the use of commando-style tactics is reminiscent of the attack by Black September terrorists on the Israeli team at the Munich Olympics in 1972. The manner of their approach by sea suggests they have learned how to grab vessels from the pirates of the Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Today's jihadi terrorists also know how to borrow the most effective methods of criminal groups - for moving money, arms and people.

Why did they attack hotels?
The two tourist hotels, along with the railway station and restaurants, were classic 'soft' targets. Unlike 'hard' targets, such as airports and military installations, security is minimal. Their vulnerability to attack has been exposed by the events in Mumbai and elsewhere: this was the eighth major attack in a year on international hotels, including the devastating suicide bombing of the Marriott in Islamabad.

Why was only one terrorist left alive?
We do not know precisely how each terrorist died. But, traditionally, special forces do not aim to take prisoners - it leads to the messy business of arrest, formal charge and court proceedings in which critical details of their own methods, which they like to keep secret, come into the open. When extremists took over the Iranian Embassy at Prince's Gate in London in 1980, the SAS rescue party killed all but one of the attackers, and made it plain they wished they had killed the survivor.How many hostages were killed by Indian forces?
We do not know how many of the 170-plus fatalities had already been caused by the terrorists before the Indian security forces arrived, and how many by the troops when they entered the two hotels and the Nariman Jewish centre. But they hardly adopted a softly-softly approach. For instance, if the world could watch on television while commandos rappelled down from a helicopter above the Nariman house in broad daylight, then so could the terrorists.

Will it happen again?
There is now every likelihood that jihadi groups are planning attacks on others tourist targets in the run-up to Christmas. The key element - the fanatical jihadi recruit - is in copious supply.

Is India ready?
Clearly not. The Indian authorities were caught flat-footed, hence the offers of resignations from state and government ministers. Despite the previous attacks on Mumbai, and the attacks in Jaipur, Ahmedabad, Delhi and Bangalore, the authorities seem to have had no clue that this attack was coming. Now, the country is to have a homeland defence department like those in the US and UK. But if the enemy is definitely Lashkar e Taiba - as the Indian Criminal Investigation Bureau has leaked - then much depends on the volatile state of India's relations with Pakistan over Kashmir, which is proving as big a security threat to the region and the world as Afghanistan.

What is Lashkar e Taiba?
The group - it translates as 'fighters of the pure' - was established 20 years ago to fight the Indian occupation of part of Kashmir and was initially aided by the ISI, the infamous Pakistan Inter Service Intelligence agency. Pervez Musharraf tried to close them down after the murder of the American journalist Daniel Pearl. But they are known to have a strong following, with several thousand militants prepared to fight.

Is there an al-Qaeda connection?
Indirectly, yes. There may even be a direct link. Al-Qaeda is a backer of Lashkar e Taiba and has helped it with funding and training. Osama bin Laden himself is said to be as interested in the Kashmir cause as much as the cause of the Taliban in Afghanistan as a springboard for global Jihad. Lately, al-Qaeda is reported to have been setting up new training camps in Pakistan for young foreign fighters from Chechnya, Uzbekistan, the Arabian Peninsula and Turkey for jihadi operations in the Gulf and Europe. There is now emerging a generalised jihadi campaign to test the new Barack Obama presidency. The attacks and initiatives are loosely coordinated, but not centrally commanded from one base. The Mumbai attack looks like the first in the campaign.

What is the biggest risk now?
The worry is that India will bow to popular resentment against Pakistan and mount a reprisal. The attack has put the dispute over Kashmir right at the top of the agenda, and it is now a bigger issue for the regional jihadis than Afghanistan. There has been no progress on reaching a deal over the territory, disputed since independence in 1947. The hardline nationalists in India might argue that they have to strike as the US-led coalition struck Afghanistan as the base of al-Qaeda following the September 11 attacks of 2001. This risks an all-out war with Pakistan, this time involving nuclear weapons.

Is Britain ready?
The UK is a target for jihadi militants trained in Pakistan, such as the group led by Mohamed Sadique Khan that bombed the London underground and the bus on July 7, 2005. While Britain has access to far more highly trained forces, including armed police and special forces, than India could muster in Mumbai, in order to tackle the new commando-terrorist tactics of the Jihadi terrorists we need urgent changes to the command structure of anti-terrorist agencies in the UK.

What needs to change?
In Britain, as in America, too much of homeland security provision is lip service. After 7/7, the JTAC (Joint Terrorism Analysis Committee) was formed to coordinate intelligence. But there is no centralised anti-terrorism command. The ministries, armed services and police still fight too many turf wars. They want to keep control of their own patch. Now there must be one single commander for anti-terrorist operations, answerable to one minister who works directly to the prime minister. There must be a National Security Council, chaired by the PM on important occasions. Working with the JTAC, which has been doing good work in analysis since it was set up, must be a JTOC - a Joint (anti) Terrorist Operational Command - which coordinates the short and long-term planning and operations of all civil and security agencies involved in a major emergency - from terrorist attack to natural disaster. Finally, an elite force of anti-terrorist commandos, from police and military, needs to be trained on SAS lines for internal UK security, and distributed on a regional basis – otherwise it would take too long to move them into action. ·