The million-dollar pirates
The crucial waterway separating Africa from the Arabian peninsula is now swarming with modern-day buccaneers
Who is attacking whom?
Pirates from Somalia have attacked at least 61 ships this year alone. It's the biggest surge of piracy in modern times, and has turned the Gulf of Aden - the vital link connecting the Suez Canal and Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, through which 20,000 ships pass each year - into the world's most dangerous waterway. Last week a Ukrainian ship carrying 33 Russian-made tanks, weapons and ammo (for which the kidnappers initially demanded an £11m ransom) was seized, and is now encircled by US navy craft. Somali pirates currently hold at least 12 foreign ships and more than 200 crew members. As a result, insurance premiums have soared; it now costs $9,000 to send a cargo through the Gulf, up from $900 a year ago. Ship owners say they may have to reroute their vessels around Africa, massively increasing costs.
Just who are these pirates?
In the early 1990s many Somali fishermen became incensed by the foreign vessels trawling Somali waters. They would board foreign boats close to shore and demand their share of the catch. It did not take long for them to realise that there was more money to be made by hijacking boats and holding the crews for ransom. Three years ago there were only about a hundred pirates. Today there are thought to be as many as 1,200. Most are based in Puntland, a semi-autonomous region on the Horn of Africa. The pirate hub is the Puntland fishing village of Eyl, now a boom town, where pirates buy luxury 4x4s and build smart new homes, men with laptops calling themselves "pirate accountants" come and go, and restaurants catering for the captured crews have newly opened.
And how exactly do the pirates work?
They usually operate from "mother ships", large fishing boats (often requisitioned) which act as launch-pads for small, fast speedboats carrying pirates toting AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades and scaling ladders. Targeted crews are seldom able to prevent themselves being captured. "Between the time you see them and the time they control the boat, it takes 15 minutes maximum," says Patrick Marchesseau, captain of the French luxury yacht Le Ponant, hijacked in April by two boats launched from a Yemeni-flagged trawler. The mother ships are very hard to pick out among the Gulf's many fishing boats and dhows, and they give the pirates a considerable range. Their crews use GPS devices to track their prey. Five years ago, the International Maritime Organisation advised ships to stay 50 nautical miles off Somalia's coast. Today that has been extended to 200 miles; a Spanish fishing trawler was seized 247 miles off the coast in June.
What do the pirates do then?
Most of them are not interested in the ships' cargoes. They just want to make use of them and their crews to extort money from international shipping operators. It is believed that once the pirates' bosses have a ship's name, they immediately use the internet to research how much money they're likely to make. Most owners pay up quickly, transferring money through a network of bank accounts and private security operators. Ransoms this year alone have included a German-registered freighter released for $800,000, and a Danish icebreaker freed for $1.6m. The owners of Le Ponant reportedly paid $2m. According to the shipping paper Lloyd's List, payments could surpass a total of $50m this year. And of course, the ransoms only feed the pirates' appetite for hijacking, while also allowing them to upgrade their technology.
How can the problem be tackled?
While the shipping industry has long called for a military response, only the French have launched an all-out response: two commando raids, one two weeks ago and the other in April, resulted in the rescue of two sailors and some ransom money, the seizure of twelve pirates and the killing of another. But such an approach carries risks. Until now, captured crews have seldom been harmed (only two sailors have been killed, apparently unintentionally). But in response to the recent raid on the French yacht, a group of pirates based in Eyl has warned that they will now behead any European who falls into their hands should France fail to release the captured pirates. In August, a US-led naval task force established a series of waypoints marking a safe corridor through the Gulf of Aden, patrolled by warships and coalition aircraft. The task force has thwarted 12 hijacking attempts and sunk two skiffs, but it has failed to prevent the surge of attacks; fast-moving buccaneers have even hijacked ships inside the security area. The UN is working on a resolution for tougher action in Somali waters, but the fear is that such patrols will do little to tackle the root cause.
What is the root cause?
The political vacuum in Somalia that has existed since the fall in 1991 of the authoritarian Siad Barre regime. Since then, the country has suffered not only civil wars between different clans and separatist movements, but failed foreign interventions which, collectively, have bestowed upon Somalia the dubious honour of being not just a "failed state" but a "post-failed state". Experts agree that a strong central government is the only real solution. At present, Somalia's reputation for lawlessness means that though the US-led task force often knows where ships are being held, it seldom takes action, fearing that captured crews will be killed in the ensuing battle.
And the politics of piracy?
The five main gangs that operate along Somalia's 3,025km coastline are each tied to a powerful local warlord. Funds raised are used to arm local militias, adding to the violence and anarchy. Some of the cash is now thought to be fuelling terrorism. The threat of piracy has also made it difficult to help feed Somalia's people, who are currently at risk of a full-scale famine. Three cargo ships chartered by the UN World Food Programme were hijacked between 2005 and 2007. ·















