Afghanistan: The mess that Harry left behind

The favourable media coverage of Prince Harry's time in Afghanistan was a stunning public relations success for defence chiefs, but it merely papers over the problems facing the troops he left behind.

The extent of those difficulties - and the Labour government's role in making them worse - was exposed last month in a board of inquiry report into the death of the first British soldier to die in action in Helmand. Due to its timing, however, it has received little attention.

The board's report was released on the same day the coroner at the Oxfordshire inquest into the death of 29-year-old Capt Jim Philippson (right) in June 2006 accused the government of a "breach of trust" for failing to provide troops with vital equipment.

The coroner's focus on the lack of equipment diverted attention from the full extent of the government's "breach of trust" as revealed in the damning board of inquiry report.

Ministers insisted during the spring and summer of 2006 - amid widespread reports that commanders in Helmand had insufficient troops - that they had all the men they wanted. But the board's report shows this to be a lie and reveals that John Reid, the then Defence Secretary, imposed a 3,150 'manning cap' on UK troop levels.

Reid's "political machinations" - in part with Nato and in part with the Treasury - led to a two-month delay in an announcement of the deployment, the board said.

"Critically the Secretary of State [Reid] delayed announcing the Helmand deployment because he wanted to ensure the campaign could be won, that the 3,150 manning cap was not exceeded, and that Britain's Nato allies were also contributing," it said. Preparations for the deployment were "inhibited by the lack of early formal political direction and [the] strictly enforced manning cap".

Commanders were scathing about the 3,150 figure, which was "established upon apparently best case rather than the most likely or worst case planning assumptions" and took little account of what the enemy might do next, the board said.

Such candour is astonishing from an inquiry consisting of three relatively junior officers - a major and two captains - and shows the extent of the anger at a government which claims to be supporting the forces but often does more to hamper rather than help.

Nor does the implied criticism stop at Reid. Even after he had gone, current Defence Secretary Des Browne was telling the Commons that, throughout those critical early months in Helmand, commanders had all the troops they wanted.

"When we began to deploy in February, continuing until July 1 when full operational capability was reached, we sent the force package for which the military commanders had asked," Browne told MPs. "It was designed by the military commanders - in consultation with the chiefs of staff - to do the job."

Quite how that tallies with the military's assessment that the 3,150 manning cap was based on 'best case' planning, and took no account of what the Taliban might do, remains unclear. The board's report also points out that Reid's manning cap was just one of "the critical strategic and operational issues" that place British troops "under considerable pressure from the outset".

There was also the major problem that US and Canadian commanders in Afghanistan had "different perceptions of the threat and how to defeat it", the board of inquiry said.

While British troops were ordered to provide security that would allow Western government development agencies to help raise standards and move the economy away from its dependency on the opium crop, the US and Canadian commanders saw their aim as an all-out battle against the Taliban.

The fundamental difference in approach, and the UK government's ambivalence, has led an increasing number of British officers to ask if it is realistic to expect to achieve anything worthwhile in Afghanistan with a US-led coalition.
The full board of inquiry report ·